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The United Nations marked its sixtieth anniversary on 24 October, 2005. This was a 
considerable achievement, yet the organisation has recently been heavily criticised for the 
diplomacy breakdown over the Iraq War and the oil-for-food scandal. The UN’s overall 
achievement in six decades is also not close to what its founders hoped for. President 
Roosevelt once said that the prospective organisation should be a place in which large and 
small nations, with their willingness and responsibility, work together to maintain world’s 
peace and security. The world today, however, remains dangerous and exceedingly unequal. 
In this book, Broinowski and Wilkinson, former Australian and American diplomats 
respectively, examine why the UN is failing as an organisation at the core of an international 
system. The title comes from the phrase ‘the third try at world order’, used by renowned 
academic, John Gerard Ruggie in Winning the Peace (1996); the first try on forming a world 
order was by the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations; the second try was by the UN 
during the Cold War. Currently, the post-Cold War UN is in the third try phase. Broinowski 
and Wilkinson assess the UN’s past and current performance in the light of the Preamble of 
the UN Charter; ending the scourge of war; reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights; 
promoting social progress and better standards of life. In other words, the authors’ discussion 
is focused on three areas of the UN’s prime responsibility – security, human rights and social 
justice. The authors conclude the book with the future prospects for the UN’s third try.  
 
In the introduction, Broinowski and Wilkinson outline current and fundamental problems in 
the UN in terms of the international approach to security as the tension between unilateralism 
– represented by the Bush administration – and the multilateralism the organisation 
symbolises. The authors firstly examine the UN’s performance from the track record of the 
post-Cold War Security Council collaboration. The record of such co-operation in 
peacekeeping has been mixed. The unprecedented co-operation amongst the Security Council 
members in the First Gulf War prompted many to regard that ‘the new era, it seemed, had 
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truly dawned’ (p.27). Nevertheless, this optimism was short-lived. The peacekeeping failure 
in Somalia, unchallenged Rwandan genocide, and the Srebrenica massacre severely affected 
the Security Council members’ prospect for the UN operation. After these failures, 
Broinowski and Wilson observe, the Security Council members found consensus increasingly 
difficult to reach, as operational deficiencies and an enormous financial burden cast serious 
doubt on peacekeeping, despite the persisting good will amongst them (p.29). The Security 
Council’s cautionary approach to intervention was further altered to a great extent by the 
September 11 attacks. The Bush administration has made it clear that multilateral initiatives 
through the UN are no longer feasible in the post-September 11 world. In addition, the 
authors argue, the Cold War East-West division in the Security Council (although not related 
to communism) has not entirely disappeared. Judging by their blocking of UN intervention in 
Kosovo, Russia and China are possibly in agreement with countering the US domination in 
the organisation (p.35). The authors point out this lack of consensus is also notable in other 
security issues, such as nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Conference in 2005, for example, was a dismal failure.  
 
The UN has been criticised for its under-achievement in the human rights field on all fronts, 
including by NGOs. Nonetheless, this was mainly due to member states’ intention to keep the 
UN human rights agencies ineffectual, Broinowski and Wilkinson argue. To begin with, the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is poorly resourced, two-thirds of its 
budget relies on voluntary contributions from member states, and the number of staff is often 
inadequate to investigate a particular subject (p.107). In fact for four decades, the UN High 
Commission for Human Rights did not even have a high commissioner (p.107). Human 
rights abusers are more often than not member governments, and they are just too eager to 
cite the “non-intervention to domestic matters” principle defined in the UN Charter Article 
2(7). In particular, Broinowski and Wilkinson are highly critical of both the US and 
Australian governments’ poor record in supporting the UN human rights accords. Rather than 
articulate their criticisms, the authors let the facts speak for themselves. The US has refused 
to abide by the International Court of Justice, and refused to ratify the International 
Convention Against Torture (ICAT). Likewise, Australia rejected an optional protocol to the 
ICAT, and refused the UN declaration on the rights of indigenous people’s “self-
determination” clause. Their stance over the human rights issue symbolises division between 
the US and its friends on ‘one side, and the rest the other’ (p.110). The unilateralists maintain 
that human rights matters are domestic matters, not a business for international organisations. 
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The UN’s weaknesses on human rights issues are illustrated by the authors’ comment on the 
advancement of the rights of women and children – the UN is not lacking advocacy or 
institutional framework, but ‘what is lacking after 60 years is implementation’ (p.124). As 
some member states openly ignore human rights initiatives without any risk of facing 
disciplinary measures, this comment rings true. 
 
The lack of contribution by the member states in social justice matters is also of great 
concern in ‘The Third Try’. The member states are refusing to seriously collaborate in 
narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and to address fundamental issues, 
including population, health and environment. Despite good intentions, aid money often ends 
up in state leaders’ overseas bank accounts, and feeds government corruption. How about fair 
trade? Broinowski and Wilkinson charge that although some rich nations have paid lip 
service to fair trade with indebted nations, they are not prepared to lift subsidies to protect 
their farmers/producers. By refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the international initiative 
to address global warming, the US and Australian governments are also in harmony; and 
despite their rapidly expanding economies, India and China each claim poor developing 
country status in order to remain outside the Kyoto Protocol restrictions. The possible 
implications of such selfish attitudes by some states are indeed grave and the authors point 
out that the success or failure of the third try in social justice areas ‘depend on those nations’ 
governments and people reaching a new understanding of what is at stake: our survival’ 
(p.192). 
 
It is important to note that The Third Try is not a catalogue of the UN’s failures and 
shortcomings. The authors give the organisation overdue credit for some of its achievements, 
and argue that criticisms made by some states against the UN are unwarranted. The authors’ 
prospect for the UN’s third try, therefore, depends on the member states’ will. As Broinowski 
and Wilkinson make clear in introduction, ‘The Third Try’ is targeted at the general reader, 
and they cover the broad issues of the UN’s work. While it does not give in-depth analysis on 
any particular topic, this book undoubtedly gives a good glimpse of the state of the UN today 
and the overwhelming tasks assigned to it. Ultimately, this book sheds light on why, with all 
their different priorities and political interests, it is so hard to maintain the United Nations 
Organisation as a locus of cooperation for its member states. 
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